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The Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa and the Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome outbreak in the Republic of Korea have given huge impacts in different
aspects. Health security is no more a new coinage. Global health security
became more realistic in its practical application. In the perspective of global
health, it will be helpful to peruse lessons learned from the Ebola outbreak in
West Africa and MERS outbreak in Korea.Infectious diseases have a long history threatening
human. Today’s expanding travel and trade spread
emerging infectious diseases. Geographical distance is
no more hindrance in transmission of infectious dis-
eases. As cultural and ecological frontiers were crossed,
populations were exposed to imported infectious dis-
eases. Spanish conquest brought small pox to Mexico
ending up to die 90 percent of populations [1]. There are
also deliberate use of pathogens as agents of bioterror-
ism, including the use of small pox by British forces
against Native Americans during the American colonial
conflict, [2] and use of anthrax spores targeting members
of the US Congress and media in 2001 [3]. Today’s air
travel has increased the global risk, and consequent fear,
of the rapid, inadvertent, or intentional introduction of
an emerging infectious diseases.
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa has shown how
globally connected we are today. Bad news is that Ebola
is not to be the last infectious disease threat that we face:
HIV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV), H1N1 influenza, and SARS could be the
next candidates. Risk factors for disease outbreaksase Control and Prevention.
reativecommons.org/licenscontain population growth, civil unrest and conflict,
natural disasters, and the increasing density of urban
areas in the developing world; the frequency of out-
breaks and epidemics might well increase [4, 5]. Thus,
we can expect infectious diseases to continue to emerge
and re-emerge unpredictably in places where we are not
lookingdor simply cannot see because of lack of
adequate, resilient public health surveillance systems
and infrastructure. In 2015, the Republic of Korea
experienced unprecedented MERS outbreak. Despite its
advanced medical facilities, the impact of this imported
infectious disease was huge [6].
In 2005, WHO revised its International Health
Regulations to better address emerging epidemic
threats such as the 2003 international outbreak of
SARS [7, 8] However, by the self-imposed deadline of
June, 2012, less than 20 percent of member states had
even self-reported full compliance with the regulations
[9]. Meanwhile, on Feb 13, 2014, the USA along with
28 partnering nations, 3 international organizations, or
WHO, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
UN (FAO), and the World Organization for AnimalPublished by Elsevier Korea LLC. This is an open access article
es/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
S26 GHSA Preparation Task Force TeamHealth (OIE) launched the Global Health Security
Agenda (GHSA) [10]. GHSA was developed to
advance International Health Regulation implementa-
tion through focused activities to strengthen core
capacities, and to ensure “a world safe and secure from
global health threats posed by infectious
diseasesdwhere we can prevent or mitigate the impact
of naturally occurring outbreaks and intentional or
accidental releases of dangerous pathogens” [11]. More
than three dozen countries have made firm commit-
ments to working collectively across 11 GHSA tech-
nical targets. The GHSA provides a framework and
path with clear targets and milestones to accelerate
progress in strengthening of participating country’s
public health systems for global health security. A
robust health system to stop naturally occurring out-
breaks of infectious disease and the deliberate use of a
biological agent is necessary. These include a national
biosecurity system that ensures that especially
dangerous pathogens are secured with biosafety and
biosecurity best practices in place, a nationwide labo-
ratory network with a specimen referral system
reaching at least 80% of its population and with
effective modern diagnostics in place to detect
epidemic-prone diseases, a timely biosurveillance
electronic reporting system meeting WHO, OIE, and
FAO requirements, a dedicated workforce of medical
and public health professional s including at least one
trained field epidemiologist per 200,000 population,
and a public health emergency operations centre with
the capacity to coordinate an effective emergency
response within 120 min [11]. The most effective
systems are those that are in use every day and can be
scaled up in an emergency. The West African Ebola
epidemic has not been limited to Guinea, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone. There have been inadvertent in-
troductions from the affected countries to Nigeria,
Senegal, Mali, Spain, and the USA [12e16]. The same
is true of MERS. These importation events were
quickly controlled and these countries remain Ebola
and MERS free. If west African countries have suitable
public health system, the past year would have looked
very different. Although the threat of Ebola importa-
tion contributed to preparation of an effective response,
the other countries already had components of the
GHSA in place, and although not fully developed it
showed that even nascent capacity was crucial in
facilitation of a timely response. In Nigeria, a dedi-
cated public health emergency operations centre for
polio eradication and a cadre of Field Epidemiology
Training Program-trained [17] epidemiologists facili-
tated the multisectoral coordination and extensive
contact tracing efforts needed to control the outbreak
once it spread as it spread within Lagos, and from
Lagos to a second city [12]. A common theme in
quelling the Ebola importation events has been the
ready availability of trained ministry of health staffwho used existing surveillance systems, laboratories,
and public health emergency operations capabilities to
quickly control Ebola. Unfortunately, there remain far
too many blind spots around the globe where public
health systems lack trained disease detectives, func-
tional laboratories, and quality surveillance data to
make timely decisions about the use of resources to
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease
threats within their borders. Attaining GHSA targets
and achieving compliance with International Health
Regulations is the foundation for making the world
safer from infectious disease threats, but we must also
strengthen our global infrastructure to respond to acute
events that exceed national capacities.
In MERS outbreak in Korea, cultural risk factors
dominated the advanced medical facilities. The “doctor
shopping” makes the situation worse: An index case
visited several hospitals ending up with national outbreak
with 186 confirmed cases. As the WHO-Korea joint
mission team concluded, this outbreak was unexpected,
and MERS-CoV was unfamiliar to all doctors and gen-
eral public in Korea. The join team summarized several
factors contributed to the spread of MERS-CoV in
Korea: (1) suboptimal Infection Prevention and Control
(IPC) measures in hospitals; (2) crowded emergency and
multibed rooms; (3) the practice of “doctor shopping.”
which involved visits to multiple hospitals; and (4) the
custom of having many family members or other visitors
in the patient’s room, which led to the secondary spread
of infection among contacts [17]. Despite these diffi-
culties, the Ministry of Health and Welfare made full
efforts for the early identification of cases, the quaran-
tine/isolation and monitoring of all contacts and sus-
pected cases, the full implementation of IPC measures,
and risk communication to the public and national and
international partners and overcome the epidemic [17].
Especially, the contact tracing and monitoring was
notable. For contact tracing contract lists were obtained
by interviewing cases, viewing CCTV surveillance, and
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of mobile
phones. Close contacts with confirmed or suspected cases
were quarantined at home or at health facilities and
monitored actively twice a day by phone call, checking
for fever or any new symptoms for 14 days from the last-
exposure date. Law enforcement was in place for non-
compliant persons. If any suspected case was detected
during the quarantine period, he/she is isolated, and
respiratory specimens were immediately obtained for
laboratory confirmation. It was multisectoral collabora-
tion. The number of quarantine was over 10,000 it its
peak in early June, 2015 [17].
Under WHO’s IHR context, GHSA is still a step
stone to make rapid progress strengthening our collec-
tive health security through country and international
capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
disease threats, both naturally occurring and intention-
ally released. The West African Ebola epidemic
Global Health Security S27reminded us that feasibility and usefulness of global
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